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Abstract
Evolving business models, computing paradigms, and management practices are rapidly
re-shaping the usage models of ICT infrastructures, and demanding for more flexibility and
dynamicity in enterprise security, beyond the traditional “security perimeter” approach.
Since valuable ICT assets cannot be easily enclosed within a trusted physical sandbox any
more, there is an increasing need for a new generation of pervasive and capillary cyber-
security paradigms over distributed and geographically-scattered systems.
Following the generalized trend towards virtualization, automation, software-definition,
and hardware/software disaggregation, in this paper we elaborate on a multi-tier architec-
ture made of a common, programmable, and pervasive data-plane and a powerful set of
multi-vendor detection and analysis algorithms. Our approach leverages the growing level
of programmability of ICT infrastructures to create a common and unified framework that
could be used to monitor and protect distributed heterogeneous environments, including
legacy enterprise networks, IoT installations, and virtual resources deployed in the cloud.
1 Introduction
Current practice in enterprise cyber-security is largely characterized by the dominance of the
“security perimeter” model, which assumes safe isolation of enterprise ICT assets by physical
or virtual network segmentation, hence concentrating protection at the perimeter only. How-
ever, evolving business models and new value chains are increasingly requiring to combine ICT
resources strewn across several geographic locations and demanding for more flexibility and
dynamicity in enterprise security. ICT systems are undergoing a continuous transformation
towards multi-domain architectures (including IoT installations) and virtualization (including
externalization and usage of cloud services), which progressively blurs the boundaries between
public zones and private domains. Specific factors that are contributing to opening new breaches
in the security perimeter, making it an ineffective and obsolete concept, include [25]:
• externalization and oﬄoading: the cloud and similar facilities host sensitive processes and
data in third parties infrastructures, even shared with other customers;
• multiplicity and heterogeneity of domains : sensors, actuators, and other things in harsh
environments with limited processing capabilities are more exposed to compromise than
other IT assets in enterprise networks; for instance, recent botnets like Mirai, Brickerbot,
and Hajime have demonstrated the vulnerability of IoT as well as the possibility to exploit
compromised devices to carry out large DDoS attacks (1 Tb/s and above) [19];
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• personal and mobile devices : bringing personal devices as smartphones, tablets, and re-
movable media at work (Bring Your Own Device, BYOD) is already a major trend in
organizations [17];
• Inflexible defense: DDoS and high rates of traffic often turn into either failing open
(allowing traffic to pass without inspection to maintain availability), or failing closed
(blocking all traffic to maintain security but causing business disruption).
Since valuable assets cannot anymore be kept inside a trusted physical sandbox, there is an
increasing need for new forms of pervasive and capillary control techniques to tackle network
threats, which are able to correlate events in both time and space dimensions, provide timely
operational information to feed novel disruptive approaches capable of estimating the risk in
real-time, and carry out focused and effective defensive and mitigation actions. Current cyber-
security technologies suffer from important limitations, which make them less effective in the
evolving scenario, especially against recent complex multi-vector attacks:
• intrinsic rigidity, due to the difficult to change architecture and system configuration:
network partitioning, deployment of hardware or software security appliances (including
the necessary agents), routing and switching policies;
• substantial inefficiency, because a) network traffic is often bounced across different appli-
ances for analysis, inspection, mitigation, and processing, hence wasting bandwidth and
increasing latency; b) similar or the same operations are carried out by different appliances
(e.g., packet and software inspection, log analysis), which often are not interoperable;
• narrow scope, since most appliances usually deal with specific aspects only (e.g., fire-
walling, antivirus, event and log management, intrusion, deny of service) and consider a
restricted set of events and devices;
• processing overhead to analyze packets, software, behavior, events, and logs, which even-
tually slows down systems and may be unsustainable by simplest devices (smartphones,
IoT);
• outdated models: the presence of personal and mobile devices, the broad availability of
removable media, the pervasive coverage of public wireless networks, interconnection to
IoT devices, and externalization and oﬄoading of processing/storage are the main factors
that, especially when combined together, are increasingly opening new breaches in the
security perimeter, making it an ineffective and obsolete concept.
In this paper, we envision a new paradigm for managing cyber-security threats in heteroge-
neous environments. Our approach aims at fostering the transition from multiple independent
security appliances to a common framework, leveraging the increasing level of programmability
of ICT infrastructures. We describe a multi-tier architecture (Fig. 1) that decouples a pervasive
and shared context fabric from centralized business logic; the former is responsible to monitor
the environment and to enforce security actions in a capillary way, whereas the latter collects
detection and mitigation algorithms that are usually provided by different security appliances.
A comprehensive presentation layer will facilitate the interaction with users and other security
systems. Our architecture also includes specific elements for collection and secure conservation
of forensic information for future investigation and possible use as evidence in court, since com-
pliance to relevant normative will be ever more part of the design of cyber-security systems in
the next future.
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Figure 1: The complexity and multi-vector nature of recent cyber-security threats require a
transition from current narrow-scope silos to a more integrated multi-vendor layered and open
framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews current approaches and trends in
distributed security monitoring. In Section 3 we outline the main concept behind our approach
and describe the overall framework. In Section 4 we discuss the architecture design and the main
components we are going to use for realizing our framework. Finally, we give our conclusions
and describe future work in Section 5.
2 Related work
With the increasing uptake of cloud and IoT technologies, micro-firewalls and distributed fire-
walls are emerging to protect isolated or virtual resources outside of the enterprise perimeter
[20].
Threat identification by exploiting network programmability has already been investigated
by several research papers (e.g., [27, 21]. Several tools are already available that collects flow
statistic from network devices through protocols as SMTP, NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX, and, more
recently, OpenFlow [23].
We observe a generalized trend from centralized standalone security boxes to more dis-
tributed frameworks, though programmability of networks is still partially exploited and unified
control and management is missing.
3 A Distributed Framework for Identification of Network
Threats
The underpinning concept of our approach is a transition from multiple independent security
appliances to a common framework, where cyber-security is managed in a coordinated way, as
shown in Fig. 1. Our purpose is to exploit and improve available interfaces and protocols for
programmable communication infrastructures, hence our work will focus on network threats.
In this context, the main challenge is to build the necessary knowledge and awareness both in
physical and virtual environments, by real-time collection of massive events from a multiplicity
of capillary sources, their inter- and intra-domain correlation in space and time, and the appli-
3
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Figure 2: Overall concept and structure of the proposed framework.
cation of remediation actions, while maintaining essential properties such as forwarding speed,
scalability, autonomy, usability, fault tolerance, resistance to compromises, and responsiveness.
Fig. 2 pictorially depicts the reference scenario and the structure for a novel multi-layer
lawful-compliant cyber-security framework over large, distributed, and even virtualized envi-
ronments. It drives beyond the legacy “security perimeter” concept by building on pervasive
and capillarity programmability of the communication infrastructure. The framework is orga-
nized in three logical layers: context fabric, business logic, and presentation. The picture also
shows the logical components, together with their main implications and tasks at each layer.
The context fabric entails a rich set of traffic filtering, packet inspection, processing (and,
likely, storage) functions that are delegated to specific (physical or virtual) networking devices
for performance and privacy matters. In our vision, such functions will no more rely on ded-
icated hardware appliances or virtual software functions; rather, the ambition is to shape the
network behavior by building on the growing availability of flexible and programmable data
planes and acceleration features. The business logic combines and correlates local information
from multiple monitoring points, in the same or different domains, and builds system-wide situ-
ational awareness that allows to promptly detect and predict multi-vector and interdisciplinary
cyber-attacks. Knowledge created at this level is presented to users for awareness and for iden-
tification of remediation and mitigation actions; it can then be shared with other administrative
domains to coordinate response to new threats and attacks. In this layer, storage of data with
legal validity is essential for off-line analysis and cyber-crime investigation. Finally, presen-
tation of the processed information, events, and knowledge to humans provides knowledge of
vulnerabilities, threats, anomalies, and attacks, so that countermeasures can be taken manually
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Figure 3: Information workflow and system architecture.
or automatically; in addition, log and proof of suspicious events are to be collected and should
allow backtrace of activity in relevant domains.
Our design considers the duality and synergy between the information workflow and the
control, processing and management architecture, as shown in Fig. 3. On the one hand, the
information workflow better explains the logical processing flow. Local tasks (to be delegated
to data sources) collect and aggregate data, and filter and process packets; identification al-
gorithms (deep data analysis and correlation) build system-wide knowledge and situational
awareness; data representation stores and visualize information for humans, and allows system
administrators to identify possible remediation and mitigation actions. On the other hand, the
control, processing, and management architecture shows the architectural elements and the or-
chestration functions. Due to its complexity, the architecture is further split into several logical
planes: data, control, computing, orchestration, and management.
3.1 Context Fabric
The context fabric is responsible for collecting and aggregating information that is relevant for
threat identification, as well as for classification, filtering, and processing of network packets.
Data, events, and security logs must be collected capillary within the system, from heteroge-
neous sources in networking and computing devices.
The context fabric runs lightweight tasks in local networking devices. It leverages the
growing level of programmability of networking infrastructures, which enable to push much
more intelligence to network devices, well beyond the flow-level reporting already available
today for anomaly detection (e.g., NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX). In addition, emerging architectures
and paradigms known as fog computing [24, 14] can be used to delegate processing tasks to a
broader range of devices.
The architecture of the context fabric is organized in two planes (see Fig. 3). At the data
plane, lightweight filtering and inspection tasks handle packets without putting significant stress
to the computing resources needed. Our interest is not only limited to flow programmability
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(e.g., OpenFlow [11], NetConf [13]), but it also extends to hardware and software acceleration
frameworks for fast packet processing (e.g., Intel DPDK [4], FD.io [5], Snabb switch [10],
IOVisor [6], BESS [2]) that create fast paths inside switching and routing devices, including
virtual functions in hypervisors.
At the control plane, the need is the ability to discover, configure, and manage local hetero-
geneous resources. The purpose is to build a common and uniform abstraction of the underlying
data planes, by extending existing protocols and interfaces (e.g., OpenFlow [11], Netconf/Yang
[13], P4 [9, 15], RestConf [12]), while avoiding to overwhelm the network with excessive over-
head. Access control is expected to provide fine-grained policies for data access, usage, and
storage. This includes the capability of programming the underlying network layer, which may
lead to serious security concerns if carried out in an uncontrolled and untrusted way.
One of the main limitation of existing technologies is that only simple data plane programs
are allowed, i.e., without support for complex programs created according to the split data/con-
trol plane paradigm as originally proposed with SDN/OpenFlow. The challenges are therefore
i) to support more powerful programs, which can operate according to the split data/control
plane paradigm; ii) to support more powerful actions on the data in transit, which enable to im-
plement some proactive security actions (e.g., drop network traffic, modify packet information,
craft ad-hoc packets for specific purposes) that go beyond simple monitoring.
3.2 Business Logic
The main task of the business logic layer is to extract knowledge from the multiplicity and
heterogeneity of data collected by the context fabric. The challenge is the definition of innovative
algorithms that define which metrics are needed for each monitored point and correlate them
in both time and space dimensions. Such analysis could be based on Attack Graphs, Attack
Surface analysis, Kill Chain definitions and Attack trees models with the support of the deep
learning techniques, Petri nets, and strategic models such as Stackelberg leadership model,
Artificial Neural Networks.
The definition of algorithms for threat and anomaly detection should consider big data and
machine learning capabilities to add predictive and proactive capabilities to existing security
tools and systems. Multi-domain analysis and correlation of capillary data allows to promptly
detect and predict multi-vector and interdisciplinary cyber-attacks, and to build wide awareness
and coordinated response to new threats and attacks. The framework should also account for
relevant events and data to be stored as evidence in case of suspicious activity, in order to be
used as evidence in case of forensics investigation.
Processing and analysis of network traffic flows can reveal personal data, secrets, intellec-
tual properties, habits, behaviors, etc., hence harming fundamental rights of organizations and
humans. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data is going to revolutionize the privacy landscape in all Eu-
ropean Countries. It is of paramount importance that all data gathered in any cyber-security
monitoring framework will be compliant with said Privacy Regulation. In addition, there are
specific requirements for legal validity of logs and events in court.
Data protection should consider anonymization and pseudonymization techniques that can
hide the identify and the behavior of systems and users outside criminal investigations. Legal
validity of the extracted data to be used in case of forensics investigation should be tackled, by
considering technologies and mechanisms to protect the integrity, origin, and trustworthiness
of data (e.g., digital signing, timestamping, message integrity codes, one-way encryption, )
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according to the requirements and guidelines settled by normative frameworks.
3.3 Presentation
Risks, vulnerabilities, on-going attacks, and threats must be depicted to organizations and
their security staff in the appropriate manner to support timely and effective reaction to cyber-
security threats, by settling proper remediation and mitigation actions.
At the management plane (see Fig. 3), visualization solutions may rely on multi-layer soft-
ware architectures and REST-based APIs for accessing threats and attacks database by multiple
devices, flexible graphical layouts defined by templates and style-sheets to adapt the representa-
tion to heterogeneous devices and platforms, event-driven publish/subscription mechanisms for
real-time notification of threats, anomalies, and attacks. The interface should also provide the
ability to trigger pre-defined remediation actions, as well as to define new ones as new threats
are identified. The capability to automate response allows faster mitigation for well-known
attacks.
Managing the underlying infrastructure and adapting it to the evolving scenario is perhaps
the most challenging issue for the whole framework. The orchestration plane is responsible
for deploying and coordinating the hardware/software components over a mix of pervasive
resources. The purpose is to understand which tasks should be oﬄoaded and which tasks
must be performed centrally. To this end, the target is to run detection algorithms and the
business logic on high-performance, reliable, and protected infrastructures (e.g., private cloud
installations), while oﬄoading monitoring, inspection, and filtering tasks to local resources. In
case of oﬄoading, the orchestrator is responsible to select the proper resource (e.g., hardware
switch or virtual switch in hypervisor) according to specific requirement and constraints by the
algorithms (e.g., inspect incoming traffic, monitor traffic sent by host X, etc.).
4 Platform Design
Starting from the main concept and the conceptual architecture devised in Section 3, we have al-
ready derived the preliminary platform design shown in Fig. 4. It entails a number of functional
elements that are necessary to implement the whole framework.
The programmable switch is responsible for traffic inspection and simple analysis, hence
implementing the data plane of the context fabric. It will carry out filtering and processing
operations by hardware or software acceleration mechanisms. Data, events, and measurements
extracted will undergo a certification process to produce trusted information for forensics and
lawful investigation. The switch will offer both a programming interface to configure filtering
rules and oﬄoad simple tasks, as well as a data publication interface to export collected infor-
mation to the controller (control plane of the context fabric). The switch will be an enhanced
version of existing SDN devices; Open vSwitch [7] and Quake (user-space switch part of the
OpenVolcano suite [16]) are two alternatives that will be considered in the implementation.
OpenFlow [11] will likely be used as protocol interface between the controller and the switch,
but we will also consider the applicability and appropriateness of NetConf [13]. Our target is
a modular software implementation, which could be used in hypervisors and easily combined
with software/hardware acceleration frameworks.
The controller translates (or “compiles”) technology agnostic programs and configurations
(Northbound interface) into specific SDN protocols (Southbound interface). A similar opera-
tion is performed in the opposite direction for data, events, and measurements. The controller
is responsible for all switches in a domain or subdomain: it manages network topology, recovers
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Figure 4: Reference platform design
from errors, collect data and measurements; in our architecture, it will also be responsible for
data aggregation and anonymization. Anonymization is required to use data and measurements
outside of legal investigation for threat identification without breaking confidentiality and pri-
vacy. The RestConf [12] protocols already provides a descriptive semantics for describing the
network behavior, but it may be unsuitable for task oﬄoading and complex filtering rules;
we will look for existing or new alternatives. OpenDayLight [8], a modular SDN platform,
and Magma, SDN controller part of the OpenVolcano suite [16], will be considered as base
technologies to implement the controller.
The orchestrator is the smarter engine of the whole platform. It includes abstractions and
models to split detection algorithms and mitigation policies in centralized and distributed com-
puting tasks; centralized tasks perform data correlations and analysis, whereas distributed tasks
are responsible for filtering, deep packet inspection, simple local processing. The distribution
of tasks between the cloud and local devices is very similar to fog computing, hence we will
consider recent concepts in this field, such as [18, 26]. A specific task for the orchestrator is au-
tomation and abstraction of the underlying infrastructure configuration starting from high-level
policies; in this respect, an “intent framework” is envisaged to translate high-level description
of monitoring and analysis information into specific instructions; this can be viewed as special
application of the Network-as-a-Service paradigm to Monitoring/Inspection-as-a-Service [22].
Finally, data harmonization is necessary to provide common formats and syntax for storage of
data coming from different domains and (possible) different controllers.
The legal repository will be responsible for secure and trusted storage of data, information,
and events for successive lawful investigation. Key features in this case is trustworthiness, avail-
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ability, integrity, resilience, resistance to attacks, and scalability, in order to prevent alteration
or losses of data in case of attack. The repository will be an innovative storage infrastructure
specifically designed and implemented to comply with requirements for lawful applications. We
target design and implementation of a storage system suitable for preserving data with inno-
vative reliability, security, availability, and scalability features inherited by existing virtual file
systems for distributed storage of information (e.g., Ceph [3] or Hadoop [1]), through splitting
of sensitive information among different storage facilities.
The human interface is the visualization tools to draw the current cyber-security picture
and to enable quick and intuitive response to attacks. It will correlate attacks and threats with
the actual network topology, suggest remediation and countermeasures, and enable definition
of custom reaction strategies in case of new and unknown threats. Our human interface will be
developed to explicitly address interaction with management of distributed resources.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have described our concept about a new cyber-security paradigm beyond the
security perimeter model. Our work leverages programmable communication infrastructures
and focus on network threats, but we think it could be easily extended to a broader scope
(including monitoring of application events and system calls) once the first protocols for fog
computing will be available.
We have already carried out preliminary design and identification of functional components
for the whole framework. We have already gathered complementary skills and expertise in a
research consortium and we are going to start the envisaged research and implementation work
in the next months.
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